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Essay
The Use and Abuse of Rights Rhetoric:
The Constitutional Rights of Children
Lynn D. Wardle*
I. INTRODUCTION
We live in an age of rights-or at least an age of rights rhetoric. We
Americans no longer reserve rights for sublime principles such as
Jefferson's "Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness."' When we
value something, no matter how mundane, we confer a right upon it.
Americans couch nearly every controversy in the language of rights.2
Rights are the tools of a lawyer's trade. Lawyers speak the language
of rights. However, one should remember a warning (commonly)
* Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School; B.A., Brigham Young University,
1971; J.D., Duke University, 1974. Copyright 1995 Lynn D. Wardle, Provo, Utah.
I. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
2. Because rights have been extended to nearly every form of existence, any issue is
likely to be argued in terms of rights. Justice Douglas of the United States Supreme
Court, who was an avid environmentalist, once suggested that trees and the environment
had "rights." Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741-43 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (proposing that the rules of standing be expanded to give "inanimate
object[s] about to be despoiled, defaced, or invaded by roads and bulldozers" a voice
before the courts). One author has even gone so far as to suggest that animals may
deserve something similar to suffrage rights: "I am suggesting that there is nothing
unthinkable about, and there might on balance even be a prevailing case to be made for,
an electoral apportionment that made some systematic effort to allow for the
representative 'rights' of non-human life." Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have
Standing?-Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450, 487
(1972). See also Laurence H. Tribe, Ways Not to Think About Plastic Trees: New
Foundations for Environmental Law, 83 YALE L.J. 1315, 1338-46 (1974) (suggesting
the furtherance of explicit legal rights for, and human obligations to, plants, animals
and other natural "objects of beauty"). For example, in Santa Monica, California, the
City Council received unexpected opposition to an ordinance forbidding people from
using the public bathroom facilities of the opposite sex. Robert Reinhold, Santa
Monica Journal; In Land of Liberals, Restroom Rights Are Rolled Back, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 15, 1991, at A14. In response to this law designed to keep male drug dealers from
selling narcotics in women's restrooms, an activist complained that this ordinance in
fact denied women the right to use the men's room: "This is the first step down a long
dark road of restricting women's rights in the name of public safety." Id. But see David
R. Schmahmann & Lori J. Polacheck, The Case Against Rights for Animals, 22 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 747 (1995) (criticizing the movement to give animals judicial
rights).
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attributed to Mark Twain-that when the only tool you have is a ham-
mer, all of your problems begin to look like nails. Lawyers may be
making the mistake Twain alluded to by applying the rhetoric of rights
to promote the welfare of children. Lawyers may be using the wrong
tool sometimes, and in doing so, compounding the problems by the
overuse of rights rhetoric in the "children's rights" context.
The growing "cult of rights" in family law is especially troubling.3
By "cult of rights" I mean an almost mystical belief in the power of
rights, laws, and governments to do good, to solve all human
problems. In the early 1970s, a children's rights movement emerged,
drawing energy from the various civil rights movements of that time.4
Child advocates began using the language of rights to address the
needs of children: children need to be loved, therefore they have a
"right to grow up nurtured by affectionate parents."5 Children have
interests in what takes place in the political process, therefore they
should have a right to vote.6 Yet, despite over twenty years of
declaring new rights for them, the plight of the nation's children has
worsened markedly.7
3. See, e.g., Henry H. Foster, Jr. & Doris J. Freed, A Bill of Rights for Children, 6
FAM. L.Q. 343 (1972) (proposing 10 rights that should be guaranteed to children);
Richard Farson, Birthrights, A Bill of Rights for Children, MS. MAGAZINE, Mar. 1974,
reprinted in THE CHILDREN'S RIGHTS MOVEMENT: OVERCOMING THE OPPRESSION OF YOUNG
PEOPLE 325-28 (Beatrice Gross & Ronald Gross eds., 1977) [hereinafter THE CHILDREN'S
RIGHTS MOVEMENT] (proposing 10 rights for children); John Holt, Why Not a Bill of
Rights for Children?, ESCAPE FROM CHILDHOOD, reprinted in THE CHILDREN'S RIGHTS
MOVEMENT, supra, at 319, 324-25 (proposing 1 rights for children).
4. For explicit recognition of children's rights, independent of their parents' rights,
see In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), where the Supreme Court declared that "neither the
Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone." Marvin R. Ventrell,
Rights and Duties: An Overview of the Attorney-Child Client Relationship, 26 LoY. U.
CHI. L.J. 259, 265 (1995) (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 13). See also Peter Edelman,
The Children's Rights Movement, N.Y. TIMES (1975), reprinted in THE CHILDREN'S
RIGHTS MOVEMENT, supra note 3, at 203 (describing the emerging children's rights
movement).
5. The Hon. Mary Kohler, To What Are Children Entitled?, in The Rights of Children:
An Unexplored Constituency, Soc. POL'Y, Mar.-Apr. 1971, at 36, 40, reprinted in THE
CHILDREN'S RIGHTS MOVEMENT, supra note 3, at 217, 224. See also Hillary Rodham,
Childrens Rights: A Legal Perspective, in CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: CONTEMPORARY
PERSPECTIVES 21, 22-24 (Patricia A. Vardin & Ilene N. Brody eds., 1979) (discussing the
need for recognition of a child's right "to be cared for" as an explicit factor in. state
intervention policies regarding families in crisis).
6. See Farson, supra note 3, at 327.
7. See, e.g., Robert F. Drinan, Saving Our Children: Focusing the World's Attention
on the Abuse of Children, 26 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 137, 142-43 (1995) (stating that "the
United States neglects [its] children in almost countless ways"). The article specifically
addresses the deterioration in the plight of America's children:
In 1979, the poverty rate among children was 14.7%. In 1986, it was 20.4%.
... The number of children in the United States who are reportedly abused has
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This Essay will first distinguish its analysis from the views of those
who support a return to days gone by as well as from those who pin
inordinate amounts of blame on a "rights" structure.' This Essay will
then criticize some aspects of children's rights and their advocates.9
This Essay, however, will also explain why recognition of the consti-
tutional rights of children (and parents) is not only proper, but also
very important for children and for society)0° Then, from consti-
tutional history, this Essay will identify a principled approach to child-
ren's rights that is consistent with the awareness that there are better
ways to think about the interests and needs of children, and better
ways to solve their problems in our society than by the indiscriminate
use of "rights."" Finally, this Essay will relate the importance of
marriage to the rights of children, and note the limits of pluralism and
the flaws of perfectionism. 2
II. CRITICISM WITHOUT NOSTALGIA OR CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES
To avoid misunderstanding, this Essay's approach must be distin-
guished from those commentators who espouse a romanticism about
the law or about families, or yearn to return to the golden days of yes-
teryear.' 3 Nostalgia (usually fostered by highly selective memories)
does not qualify as a legal theory of merit. ' 4 The problems and
families of the 1990s are different from families and their problems a
century ago."' Society needs to meet the challenges of the modem era,
which is the greatest, most exhilarating, fulfilling, and wonderful time
for families, as well as the most challenging, dangerous, and poten-
tripled since 1980, to almost three million. The number of child murders
doubled in the 1980s. Teenage suicides doubled over the last twenty years.
Id.
8. See infra part 11.
9. See infra part 11I.
10. See infra part IV.
11. See infra part V.
12. See infra part VI.
13. See, e.g., RITA KRAMER, IN DEFENSE OF THE FAMILY: RAISING CHILDREN IN AMERICA
TODAY 6 (1983) (noting that families in the past had to face "[flamine and plague, fear
and ignorance"). Even if the golden days were, in fact, better than the present day, it
would be quite impossible to go back. See, e.g., Myron Magnet, The American Family,
1992, FORTUNE, Aug. 10, 1992, at 42, 43 (noting that the 1950s are "culturally and
socially as far away as Shangri-La").
14. See generally STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE: AMERICAN FAMILIES
AND THE NOSTALGIA TRAP (1992) (debunking some of the popular myths of the way the
family was in times past).
15. See, e.g., id., at 2-7 (outlining some of the new challenges faced by today's
families).
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tially disastrous time for families.16 Neither the romantic rhetoric nor
the rigid legal framework of 1895 suffices for the circumstances of
families and children in 1996.
This Essay's criticism of children's rights must also be distin-
guished from the critique of rights articulated by members of the
Critical Legal Studies ("CLS") movement. Those scholars assert, gen-
erally, that "rights" mask the ugly realities behind the law, realities
such as greed, pursuit of self-interest, abuse of power, and oppres-
sion; that society's power wielders can manipulate the meaning of
"rights" in any way they wish because that concept is vague and
indeterminate; and that the "regime of rights" oppresses society.' 7
Some CLS commentators assert that even the language of rights under-
mines efforts to accomplish genuine social change by diverting atten-
tion from the real abuses (power-imbalance, economic disparities, and
social oppression) and focusing on symbolic abstractions.' 8 These
commentators further argue that rights language focuses attention on a
debate over empty "parchment barriers" (Madison's memorable
phrase) that mean nothing, solve nothing, and change nothing, instead
of on action that might remedy the problems.' 9
CLS criticisms have appropriately publicized some of the lacunae
between legal rhetoric and reality, and disclosed some conflicts of
interest in the American legal system.20 The CLS critiques of rights
that could be applied helpfully to the dilemma of children's rights
include recognition that the indeterminacy of legal "rights" allows
judges to insert their personal or cultural biases into the law;2' that the
16. See KRAMER, supra note 13, at 200-07 (positing ideas on how families can meet
the challenges modern life poses).
17. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, The Critique of Rights, 47 SMU L. REV. 23, 26 (1992)
[hereinafter Tushnet, Critique of Rights] (using the CLS method to reveal that legal
victories rarely lead to political victories for those seeking the assertion of their
"rights"); Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 1392-94 (1984)
[hereinafter Tushnet, Essay on Rights] (arguing that "rights" are mischaracterizing
concepts which usually desiccate human experience) . For further examples of the CLS
concept of "rights" and CLS methodology, see generally MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987) (explaining the CLS method); ROBERTO M. UNGER, THE
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986) (discussing the movement's leading argu-
ments); Critical Legal Studies Symposium, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984) (examining
various aspects of the movement).
18. See Tushnet, Critique of Rights, supra note 17, at 24-27; Tushnet,Essay on
Rights, supra note 17, at 1382-86.
19. See Tushnet, Critique of Rights, supra note 17, at 32-34.
20. The Supreme Court has also recently "embrace[d] the idea that the creation of
rights can be destructive to democratic governance." Cass R. Sunstein, Rights and Their
Critics, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 727-28 (1995).
21. See Wendy A. Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Children's
324 [Vol. 27
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language of "rights" generates a mentality of absolutism and rigidity
incompatible with relationships that call for care, compassion, under-
standing, compromise, and balance; and that rights-talk fosters exces-
sive individualism that ignores, obscures, and harms relationships,
and sometimes causes individuals to neglect their responsibilities.22
Many of these insights, however, have been developed much more
thoroughly and persuasively by family law scholars who are not
generally identified with the CLS movement.23 For instance, Barbara
Bennett Woodhouse has very perceptively noted that "rights talk by
definition seems to exclude children simply because not all children
can talk.",24 Martha Minow has argued eloquently for the revision of
the current language of rights talk because "something [is] terribly
lacking in rights for children that speak only of autonomy rather than
need, especially the central need for relationships with adults who are
themselves enabled to create settings where children can thrive."5
The Critical Legal Studies rights-critics make two critical mistakes.
First, they overvalue the significance of their approach. Beyond dem-
onstrating that the system of legal rights is as imperfect as all other
human institutions capable of being abused and manipulated to further
the interests of the powerful at the expense of the disadvantaged (an
important but hardly' a novel insight), the CLS movement has surpris-
ingly little to offer. 6 Expert pessimism and fault-finding do not ade-
Perspective & the Law, 36 ARIz. L. REV. I1, 53-64 (1994).
22. For articles presenting a good review and critique of Critical Legal Studies
arguments about rights, see supra note 17.
23. See, e.g., MARY A. GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE (1991); Bruce C. Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism:
Some Reservations About Abandoning Youth to Their "Rights," 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV.
605; Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship and Sexual
Privacy-Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463 (1983);
Robert Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of
Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226 (Summer 1975); see generally Neil S.
Binder, Taking Relationships Seriously: Children, Autonomy, and the Right to a
Relationship, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1150 (1994) (offering a theory accounting for both
parents' rights and children's interests in family relationships).
24. Barbara B. Woodhouse, "Are you my mother?": Conceptualizing Children's
Identity Rights in Transracial Adoptions, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 107 (1995)
(noting an increasing tendency to recognize children's rights to preserve their cultural
identity in transracial adoptions); Barbara B. Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-
Centered Perspective on Parents' Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1747, 1842 (1993). See
also Barbara B. Woodhouse, Children's Rights: The Destruction and Promise of Family,
1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 497 (suggesting the increasing recognition of children's rights is
a root cause of the modem breakdown of families).
25. MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND
AMERICAN LAW 306 (1990).
26. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 20, at 729:
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quately substitute for a meaningful explanatory or operative theory.
Second, CLS scholars often undervalue the "regime of rights" that
they are so fond of criticizing. They ignore the reality of the many
wonderful contributions, successes, and unprecedented achievements
of liberty, equality, stability, and prosperity fostered by the "regime of
rights" in America and in many other nations committed to the pursuit
of liberty under law.
III. COMMON ERRORS AMONG CHILD ADVOCATES
Some advocates of children's rights commit mistakes similar to
those of Critical Legal Studies scholars: They undervalue the signifi-
cance and importance of the institutions they want to replace (marriage
and parenting), and they overvalue the capacity of their proposed
replacement (children's rights) to make things right.
A. Undervaluing the Institutions of Marriage and Parenting
Some advocates of children's rights seem to be blinded by human
failures. That is understandable. Today the failings and frailties of
families are perhaps more widely known and felt than ever before in
history. Americans hear constantly about premarital sex, incest, other
forms of family sexual abuse, abortion and other forms of child abuse,
severe child neglect, verbal and physical abuse of spouses, adultery,
divorce, desertion, "deadbeat dads," and many other dysfunctional
family failings.28 Moreover, statistically, it seems that the incidence of
In the end, I claim that the critique of rights has no merit as such, and that the
plausible claims that it contains should be stated far more cautiously and
narrowly. When so stated, the claims can be discussed as part of a debate over
which rights it is best to have, rather than as a debate over whether rights are
pernicious merely by virtue of being rights.
Id.
27. Id. at 748. "[Tlhe critics should not claim to be making so general a criticism of
rights." Id. "Rights of the most traditional sort ... may be the necessary condition for
enabling a sense of collective responsibility to flourish." Id. at 747.
28. For a sampling of some articles addressing these problems, see, e.g., Donald C.
Bross, Terminating the Parent-Child Legal Relationship as a Response to Child Sexual
Abuse, 26 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 287, 289 (1995) (reporting that 22% of adults had been
sexually abused as children) (citing David Finkelhor et al., Sexual Abuse in a National
Survey of Adult Men and Women: Prevalence, Characteristics and Risk Factors, 14
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 19 (1990)); Ann L. Estin, Economics and the Problem of
Divorce, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 517, 576-79 (1995) (discussing the evolution of
no-fault divorce and alternatives); Roger J.R. Levesque, Targeting "Deadbeat" Dads: The
Problem with the Direction of Welfare Reform, 15 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 1, 1 1-13
(1994) (discussing the problem of "fugitive" fathers); Ventrell, supra note 4, at 259
(noting that 2.9 million cases of child abuse or neglect were reported to the United
States Department of Health and Human Services in 1992, of which one million were
326 [Vol. 27
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these problems has increased significantly in American society, wholly
apart from the increased reporting of these events.29 With the drum-
beat of that kind of data constantly in the background, and sometimes
personally scarred by such family failings, some children's rights
advocates not surprisingly think that marriage is a failed institution and
that parenting is untrustworthy.
With compassion for those suffering, and commitment to justice for
them, one must also remember how many good marriages exist (and
good periods in marriages that have bad spells), and how much good
the people labeled "bad" parents contribute to the lives of their
children. Because the headlines and the talk shows neglect these
stories, Americans tend to forget the magnificent service given by ordi-
nary husbands and wives, moms and dads, stepparents, grandparents,
aunts, uncles, brothers, and sisters. We take their contributions for
granted. We forget that "the amount of social care that families pro-
vide for their elderly and handicapped members [not to mention chil-
dren] far exceeds the amount of social care provided by the state."3
We forget how many millions of parents fulfill "[a child's] ... need
for unbroken continuity of affectionate and stimulating relationships
with an adult", which is necessary for normal, healthy development.3'
Marriage is the oldest and surest method of providing committed
substantiated) (citing the NATIONAL CTR. ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT 1992: REPORTS FROM THE STATES TO
THE NATIONAL CTR. ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 9-10 (1994)); LYNN D. WARDLE &
MARY A. Q. WOOD, A LAWYER LOOKS AT ABORTION 7-11 (1982) (reciting abortion
statistics).
29. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BENNETT, OUR CHILDREN AND OUR COUNTRY: IMPROVING
AMERICA'S SCHOOLS AND AFFIRMING THE COMMON CULTURE 62 (1988) [hereinafter
BENNETT, OUR CHILDREN] (reporting that between 1960 and 1980 the rate of homicide
among the young more than doubled, the number of births to unwed teenage mothers
rose 200%, and by 1980, nearly one-half of all teenage pregnancies ended in abortion);
COONTZ, supra note 14, at 2 (reciting a depressing litany of statistics regarding children
and families). Coontz notes:
More than 20 percent of American children live in poverty .. . almost
100,000 are homeless on any given night .... Every day, 135,000 children
take a gun to school; ... in Chicago's inner city, 74 percent of the children
have witnessed a shooting, stabbing, or robbery ....
In a recent national poll, one in seven Americans claimed to have been
sexually abused as a child ....
Id.; WILLIAM MURCHISON, RECLAIMING MORALITY IN AMERICA 40.(1994) (citing a study by
the Centers for Disease Control which found that between 1970 and 1990 the rate of 15
year-old girls who had experienced sex rose from 4.6% to 25.6%).
30. Shirley L. Zimmerman, Reassessing the Effect of Public Policy on Family
Functioning, 59 SoC. CASEWORK 451, 452 (1978).
3 1. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET. AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 6 (2d ed.
1979).
328 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 27
parents for children." Marriage signals to potential parents that their
stable, long-term relationship is critical to the welfare of their
children-the welfare of the next generation." Marriage vows, if
taken seriously and followed assiduously, foster an environment in
which parents and children feel loved and secure. 34 Committed par-
ents contribute extensively to all members of society. Their example,
even more than their words, transmits not only knowledge but also the
intangible values and living-skills (including commitment, sacrifice,
and love) of society to the next generation.35 We all have a substantial
stake in the future that parents nurture for us.
How important are parents to children? Take, for example, the
problem of juvenile crime; juveniles comprise "[the fastest growing
segment of the criminal population ' ' 36 in America. Violence among
American youth is so rampant that the American Academy of Pediatrics
32. Throughout the Bible, for instance, children are considered gifts from God,
Genesis 33:5, who are to be raised properly by parents, Proverbs 22:6, with discipline,
Proverbs 13:1-4, and kindness, Colossians 3:21. See, e.g., STEPHEN MINTZ & SUSAN
KELLOGG, DOMESTIC REVOLUTIONS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE 1 (1988)
(describing the importance of the family in early colonial America).
33. Perhaps the best evidence of this message is seen when young people do not see
stable families as the norm. See, e.g., AMITAi ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY: RIGHTS,
RESPONSIBILITIES, AND THE COMMUNITARIAN AGENDA 27 (1993):
Millions of teenagers see little meaning in life other than to have a child,
without having a serious commitment to their infants. Marriage for many has
become a disposable relationship. It is all too often entered into like a rental
agreement-with an escape clause that if it does not suit the parties involved,
they may look for another apartment. We are no longer clear if and when we
ought to marry or if fidelity in marriage is to be expected. And if we beget
children, it is unclear what we owe them.
id.
34. See MURCHISON, supra note 29, at 43 (extolling the sense of security a strong
marriage gives family members). Speaking of the vows exchanged in marriage
ceremonies, Murchison writes:
Nothing is omitted; all eventualities are included in the promise. Here is
commitment in the fullest sense: It frees in the instant it binds. If the marriage
vow forecloses quick escape from the relationship, so it affords freedom from
gnawing anxiety, gained from the knowledge that one's partner is similarly
bound. In such an environment mutual trust can grow: We are in this together.
Id. Since the stability provided by marriage vows comes, in part, from their perpetuity,
the fact that divorces have never been easier to obtain necessarily weakens the above
salubrious effects. See, e.g., Robert L. Plunkett, Vow For Now, NAT'L REV., May 29,
1995, at 48, 52 (attributing the emergence of no-fault divorce laws to the abolition of
marriage).
35. See MURCHISON, supra note 29, at 45: "[M]ore unmarried relationships means
fewer of the building block institutions on which our society relies to rear children,
transmit cultural values, and produce economic wealth and community health." Id.
36. WILLIAM J. BENNETT, THE INDEX OF LEADING CULTURAL INDICATORS: FACTS AND
FIGURES ON THE STATE OF AMERICAN SOCIETY 30 (1994) [hereinafter BENNETT, INDEX]
(citing U.S. Dep't of Justice, Combating Violent Crime (1992)).
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has labeled it "a public health emergency."37 A clear connection exists
between the explosion of juvenile crime and the deterioration of the
family:
Nationally, more than 70 percent of all juveniles in state reform
institutions come from fatherless homes. . . . [E]ven after the
groups of subjects are controlled for income, boys from single-
mother homes are significantly more likely than others to
commit crimes and to wind up in the juvenile justice, court, and
penitentiary systems .... The relationship [between crime and
one-parent families] is so strong that controlling for family
configuration erases the relationship between race and crime
and between low income and crime. 38
Likewise, marriage is the best safeguard against child poverty in the
world. According to William Galston, Domestic Policy Counsel to
President Clinton:
Changes in family structure over the past generation are
strongly correlated with rising rates of poverty among children .
...[C]hild poverty rates today would be one-third lower if
family structure had not changed so dramatically since 1960.
Fifty-one percent of the increase in child poverty observed
during the 1980s is attributable to changes in family structure
during that period.39
The benefits of marriage for children extend across the board to edu-
cation, health, self-esteem, and achievements-the evidence is over-
whelming. 4° As sociologist David Popenoe has observed:
Social science research is almost never conclusive .... Yet in
three decades of work as a social scientist, I know of few other
bodies of data in which the weight of evidence is so decisively
on one side of the issue: on the whole, for children, two-parent
37. Louis S. Richman, Struggling to Save Our Kids, FORTUNE, Aug. 10, 1992, at 34.
38. Barbara D. Whitehead, Dan Quayle Was Right, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Apr.
1993, at 47, 77.
39. BENNETT, INDEX, supra note 36, at 6 (citing William Galston, Causes of Declining
Well-Being Among U.S. Children, THE ASPEN Q.,Winter 1993).
40. See, e.g., Whitehead, supra note 38, at 47.
[C]hildren in single-parent families are two to three times as likely as children
in two-parent families to have emotional and behavioral problems. They are
also more likely to drop out of high school, to get pregnant as teenagers, to
abuse drugs, and to be in trouble with the law. Compared with children in
intact families, children from disrupted families are at a much higher risk for
physical or sexual abuse. . . .Children who grow up in single-parent or
stepparent families are less successful as adults, particularly in the two
domains of life-love and work-that are most essential to happiness.
1996] 329
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families are preferable to single-parent and stepfamilies.4
We do not have to have perfect marriages or be perfect parents to
produce very good benefits for children. A perfectionist's perspective
can distort and magnify problems in marriage and parenting, making
us prone to conclude prematurely that families with problems are hope-
less, label them "dysfunctional,. 42 and give up on troubled marriages
and struggling parents too easily. A number of years ago, an editorial
in a major national newspaper related a story emphasizing the impor-
tance to children of families which many people would view as trag-
ically lost:
In a story making the rounds among child welfare workers,
Billy, who is 12, has run away at least twice from the foster home
where he was placed by the [Massachusetts] Department of
Youth Services. Each time he went back to his home-to his
alcoholic mother and to his father who routinely beats him.
After he was picked up the second time and asked why he keeps
returning to those dreadful conditions, he replied: "Why, they
love me. You should have seen what they gave me for
Christmas."
It turns out that the boy's Christmas present was a $3 pair of
sneakers, and the story is being told to explain the growing
feeling among child welfare professionals that their efforts
should be redirected toward families and away from the
traditional near-exclusive concentration on children. The
argument is that even in families usually written off as hopeless,
there may be shreds of love upon which to build; the result of
that care and attention could be a stronger and healthier society.
[The former Massachusetts State Commissioner of Youth
Services said:] "We have loaded our kids down with helpers but
we have done little to help their parents." There is some small
41. Id. at 82. For a discussion of the roles that mothers and fathers play in a child's
early development, see KRAMER, supra note 13, at 55-59.
42. It is almost impossible to escape the label of "dysfunctional." See WENDY
KAMINER, I'M DYSFUNCTIONAL, YOU'RE DYSFUNCTIONAL: THE RECOVERY MOVEMENT AND
OTHER SELF-HELP FASHIONS 12 (1992) (describing the view of families people in the
codependency movement have). Kaminer explains:
Their unhappiness begins at home, in the dysfunctional family, codependency
authors stress, drawing heavily on family systems theory explaining how
individuals develop in relation or reaction to their families. In the world of
codependency, families are incubators of disease: they manufacture "toxic"
shame, "toxic" anger, "toxic" self-doubts, any number of "toxic"
dependencies, and a "toxic" preoccupation with privacy.
Id. Because 96% of Americans suffer from some form of codependency, id. at 10, very
few families in the country are not dysfunctional. Id. at 14. "The characters of children
in dysfunctional families, which supposedly include virtually all families, are said to be
determined early on by bad relationships ... ." Id.
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amount of evidence that work with families is more cost-
effective, and certainly cheaper, than working with a child alone.
But even if it were not, it is a challenge that a caring society
should accept.
43
America has devoted a tremendous amount of resources to help
children,44 but it has expended very little effort to help families per-
form their crucial task.45 The editors of Family Perspectives, a profes-
sional journal in the field of family studies, put it this way:
The most beneficial way to ensure the positive development of
children is to support the people who are in direct contact with
them. If society supports parents in their attempt to be
responsible caretakers and provides assistance when needed, the
outcome will be more productive than if parents are not
supported or are hampered in their efforts.46
Just as we all recognize the need to provide healthy environments for
our children, we must strive to provide healthier environments for our
families.47
Thus, this Essay's first critique of children's rights is that often its
advocates undervalue marriage and parenting. They sometimes look at
problems in marriages or parenting through perfectionist lenses; if all
is not perfect, all of the time, they are ready to trash those relationships
and replace them with the abstract perfection of "rights." Children's
rights advocates often are too quick to give up on families.
43. Editorial, "They Love Me," CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 8, 1979, at 28.
44. By 1976, for instance, the federal government had developed more than 260
programs designed to help children. BENNETT, OUR CHILDREN, supra note 29, at 61-62.
45. Editorial, Focus on Children, 13 FAM. PERSP. 56 (1979).
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., BENNETT, INDEX, supra note 36, at 65:
[The] messages [that society disseminates] ultimately greatly effect [sic] the
existence and well-being of the family. It makes an enormous difference
whether children get messages from television telling them that honesty is
the best policy, and to honor their fathers and mothers--or whether they get
messages telling them that adultery is the norm, and that the breakup of a
family is an expected thing. Likewise, if schools, churches, elected officials,
community institutions, and neighborhoods are reinforcing parents' efforts, it
makes their jobs easier. If the institutions of society work at cross-purposes,
the job is harder.
Everyone knows that a child needs and deserves a nurturing, sustaining
environment. What is less commonly understood, but equally true, is that the
family also needs and deserves a nurturing, sustaining environment.
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B. Overvaluing Children's Rights
Second, some advocates of children's rights manifest the lingering
hubris of the belief in the infinite and invincible capacity of the law to
do good.48 They see law as a secular Messiah, a cure-all for every
social ill, a big yellow social bulldozer that can shove away the old
problems and build new temples of goodness.49 But rights and rela-
tionships are very different things. It is troubling to try to define
relationships between parent and child in terms that suggest separation,
individualism, boundaries, legalism, lawyers, courts, lawsuits, and
forced compliance. For example, in a recent Illinois case, the trial
judge held a woman in criminal contempt and incarcerated her because
she violated a court order by refusing to visit her children, whom the
state had taken away. 0 Justifying its affirmance of the lower court's
order, the appellate court lamented:
One would hope that courts need not order parents to visit their
children, who were removed from their parents' custody
because of physical abuse. Sadly, in the world in which we live,
such orders sometimes are necessary, as this record reveals.
Given the increasing evidence around us of family
disintegration, as well as a general breakdown in values, morals,
and judgment, trial courts in juvenile court proceedings may
need to call upon their inherent power of contempt more
frequently in order to motivate recalcitrant parents and other
respondents to comply with court orders.5'
Defining parent-child relationships in terms of rights misses the point
and undermines the real needs of the parties themselves.
48. See, e.g., Beatrice Gross & Ronald Gross, Introduction to THE CHILDREN'S RIGHTS
MOVEMENT, supra note 3, at 1-2 (aspiring to end various forms of oppression by
changing "our laws and institutions [so that they] recognize the fact that age is no
precondition to human rights").
49. Consider, for instance, the child advocate who believes that otherwise compli-
cated child custody hearings can become simple once children are given their own
lawyers: "Our intervention changes the beast .... We're not here to divide families, but
if you simply focus on the child's rights, what needs to be accomplished in each
situation becomes obvious." Heather M. Little, Kids Get Their Day in Court, CHI. TRIB.,
Apr. 17, 1994, §6, at 1, I1 (quoting Sue Davis, executive director of the Children's
Legal Clinic in Chicago). But see id. (comment of Dr. Alan Levy, professor of
psychology and custody and also custody and visitation expert) (suggesting that judges
should consider but not rely solely on what the child wants, and advocating a shift from
focusing on "children's rights" to "desired outcomes").
50. In re B.J., 644 N.E.2d 791, 792 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
51. Id. at 794. See also In re J.C., 617 N.E.2d 1378, 1381 (III. App. Ct. 1993)
(affirming the trial court's order instructing a parent who sought to terminate her
parental rights to visit her child).
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Ferdinand Schoeman observed some years ago that relations be-
tween parents and children are more aptly described in spiritual/poetic
terms than in legal terms, in terms that suggest union and identification
rather than separation. 2 As parents, we share ourselves with our
children.53 Most parents, even lawyers, willingly and happily sacrifice
for their children, yearn for their welfare, aspire and work contin-
uously for their success, encourage, love, nurture, comfort, teach,
protect, and promote them without giving any thought to the "rights"
of their children. Parents devote themselves out of love for their child-
ren, not because their children have "rights."
What happens when parents' relationships with their children are
reduced to "rights?" Divorce provides a clear example. Particularly
revealing is the relationship between noncustodial parents (fathers
mostly) and their children. Some noncustodial parents maintain very
strong relationships with their children despite the pains and obstacles
of divorce. These parents continue to share themselves with their
children, sacrifice for them, love, support, protect, and nurture them in
every way possible--even more than many parents in intact families
do. Unfortunately, however, noncustodial parents more frequently
tend to drift away (or are driven away) after divorce, and within a
short time, they no longer actively seek the welfare of their children
and often even neglect to make consistent child support payments. 4
52. Ferdinand Schoeman, Rights of Children, Rights of Parents, and the Moral Basis
of the Family, 91 ETHIcS 6, 8-9 (1980).
53. Id. at 8-9:
We typically pay attention to the rights of individuals in order to stress their
moral independence . . . . [Tihe language of rights typically helps us to
sharpen our appreciation of the moral boundaries which separate people....
We share our selves with those with whom we are intimate and are aware that
they do the same with us .... The danger of talk about rights of children is
that it may encourage people to think that the proper relationship between
themselves and their children is the abstract one that the language of rights is
forged to suit. So, rather than encouraging abusive parents to feel more
intimate with their children, it may cause parents . . . to question their
consciousness of a profound sense of identification with, and commitment
toward, their families.
Id.
54. See, e.g., Whitehead, supra note 38, at 65 (describing the alienating effects
divorce has on children's relationships with their non-custodial fathers). Whitehead
reported:
The father-child bond is severely, often irreparably, damaged in disrupted
families. In a situation without historical precedent, an astonishing and
disheartening number of American fathers are failing to provide financial
support to their children. Often, more than the father's support check is
missing. Increasingly, children are bereft of any contact with their fathers.
According to the National Survey of Children, in disrupted families only one
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Because more than a million marriages end in divorce, this tragedy
touches millions of children every year." After divorce, a non-
custodial parent's relationship with his children is reduced to one of
"rights." Children of divorce have rights galore.16 Most of them
would rather have two parents.
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn understood the limits of "rights" when, in
his celebrated commencement address at Harvard University, he
declared:
I have spent all my life under a communist regime and I will tell
you that a society without any objective legal scale is a terrible
one indeed. But a society with no other scale but the legal one
is also less than worthy of man. A society based on the letter of
the law and never reaching any higher fails to take advantage of
the full range of human possibilities. The letter of the law is too
cold and formal to have a beneficial influence on society.
Whenever the tissue of life is woven of legalistic relationships,
this creates an atmosphere of spiritual mediocrity that paralyzes
man's noblest impulses.
child in six, on average, saw his or her father as often as once a week in the
past year. Close to half did not see their father at all in the past year. As time
goes on, contact becomes even more infrequent. Ten years after a marriage
breaks up, more than two thirds of children report not having seen their father
for a year .... [W]hen asked to name the "adults you look up to and admire,"
only 20 percent of children in single-parent families named their father, as
compared with 52 percent of children in two-parent families.
Id.
55. See, e.g., Plunkett, supra note 34, at 52 (attributing the explosion of the divorce
rate to the emergence of no-fault divorce laws); see also Whitehead, supra note 38, at 50
(reporting that one million children endure divorce or separation every year).
56. The right to receive a welfare check has a similar alienating effect on children's
relationships with their fathers. In his dissent in Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587
(1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting), Justice Brennan noted:
Those who are affected by the Government in these cases are fathers and
children who have sustained a relationship whereby the child is supported by
the father, not dependent on the State. The State has told the child that if it is
to live with a mother not so fortunate, it too must become a dependent of the
State. If it does so, the child's material needs will no longer [be] met by a
father's attention to his particular child. Rather, the child will be one of many
who are supported by the Government, and the father, powerless to direct
assistance to his child, can only reimburse the Government for supporting the
entire household. Such an arrangement calls to mind Aristotle's criticism of
the family in Plato's Republic: "[E]ach citizen will have a thousand sons: they
will not be the sons of each citizen individually: any and every son will be
equally the son of any and every father; and the result will-be that every son
will be equally neglected by every father." Regardless of the benevolence with
which it is issued, a Government check is no substitute for the personal
support of a loving father.
Id. at 633 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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And it will be simply impossible to bear up to the trials of this
threateninA century with nothing but the supports of a legalistic
structure.
Whenever we infuse the language of rights into a controversy, we
invite some form of government to become involved in that contro-
versy, because we look to the government to protect our rights." By
this process we weaken the various forms of association upon which a
society is built (e.g., family, friendship, neighborhood, citizenship),
because rights necessarily focus on the demands of the individual
against the activities of the group. 9 As anthropologist Stanley
Diamond observed: "We live in a law-ridden society; law has canni-
balized the institutions which it presumably reinforces or with which it
interacts. ' 60 He lamented the "progressive reduction of society to a
series of technical and legal signals, [and] the consequent diminution
of culture, that is, of reciprocal, symbolic meanings .... ,,61 By
"legalizing" our society, we are driving wedges into the entities that
promote unity and citizenship. 62 Because we rely on the various asso-
ciations that comprise society and are necessary to provide prosperity
57. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, A World Split Apart, Commencement Address delivered
at Harvard University (May, 1978).
58. See, e.g., THOMAS PAINE, THE RIGHTS OF MAN 267, 305-09, in REFLECTIONS ON THE
REVOLUTION IN FRANCE BY EDMUND BURKE & THE RIGHTS OF MAN BY THOMAS PAINE
(Anchor Books Edition 1973) (discussing how governments are formed to preserve the
various rights of the people).
59. See GLENDON, supra note 23, at 109 (noting how "rights talk disserves public
deliberation not only through affirmatively promoting an image of the rights-bearer as a
radically autonomous individual, but through its corresponding neglect of the social
dimensions of human personhood").
60. Stanley Diamond, The Rule of Law Versus the Order of Custom, 38 Soc. RES. 42,
44 (1971).
61. Id. at 72.
62. See GLENDON, supra note 23, at 3 (noting the way "legalization" disintegrates our
culture):
This "legalization" of popular culture is both cause and consequence of our
increasing tendency to look to law as an expression and carrier of the few
values that are widely shared in our society: liberty, equality, and the ideal of
justice under law. With increasing heterogeneity, it has become quite difficult
to convincingly articulate common values by reference to a shared history,
religion, or cultural tradition. The language we have developed for public use
is ... more legalistic than [ever before, drawing] to a lesser degree on other
cultural resources. Few American statesmen today are-as Abraham Lincoln
was--equally at home with the Bible and Blackstone .... Legality, to a great
extent, has become a touchstone for legitimacy. As a result, certain areas of
law, especially constitutional, criminal, and family law, have become the
terrain on which Americans are struggling to define what kind of people they
are, and what kind of society they wish to bring into being.
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and security, 63 the consequences of the deterioration of these associa-
tions could be dire.
Some advocates of children's rights also seem to forget how sub-
jective and unstable rights are. For example, a review of children's
rights cases during the past thirty years reveals a swinging pendulum
motion. From about the mid-1960s to the early or mid-1980s, the
most prominent cases emphasized broadly the legal rights of minors.
64
For the past decade or so, however, the pendulum has swung in the
other direction, recognizing some significant restrictions on children's
rights that do not apply to adults.65 Children's rights change as the
popular social model of the family changes.
Rights advocates also forget how easily rights can be abused. For
example, the lead litigating party in many of the minors'-right-to-
abortion cases has been Planned Parenthood.66 The real dispute in
those cases did not involve parent-versus-child conflicts but rather
parent-versus-Planned Parenthood conflicts.67 Planned Parenthood
disputed the legal principle that parents would be the crucial advisor
63. See PAINE, supra note 58, at 400 (attributing to the principles of society and
civilization the safety and prosperity of the people).
64. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 651 (1979) (striking down a
Massachusetts statute requiring an unmarried pregnant minor seeking an abortion to
receive her parents' consent or, if her parents refuse to consent, to receive judicial
approval because the statute unduly burdened a minor's right to obtain an abortion);
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 83 (1976) (holding a state abortion
statute that required married women seeking an abortion to acquire written spousal
consent and unmarried minors to obtain written parental consent unconstitutional);
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583 (1975) (finding that students had the rights, under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to notice and opportunity to be heard
prior to suspension from public high school); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (holding a school policy unconstitutional because
it violated students' right to expression by prohibiting the wearing of armbands to
school in protest of the Vietnam War).
65. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995) (holding that a
public school district policy mandating random drug testing for interscholastic athletes
did not violate students' right to be free from unreasonable searches); Ohio v. Akron
Center for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990) (holding that a state statute requiring a
doctor, prior to performing an abortion on an unmarried minor, to provide notice to the
minor's parents or obtain a court order of approval did not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (finding that
public school principal did not violate students' First Amendment rights when he
censored part of the student newspaper); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S.
675 (1986) (upholding school district's actions of sanctioning a public high school
student for using indecent language in his nominating speech during a student
assembly).
66. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992); Planned Parent-
hood v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983); Danforth, 428 U.S. at 52. These cases all
addressed, inter alia, mandatory parental participation laws.
67. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2823; Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 478; Danforth, 428 U.S. at 54.
The Constitutional Rights of Children
for their pregnant minor children in an abortion decision.68 All too
often it seems that activist groups on the right and the left use chil-
dren's rights (or parents' rights) to further their much broader social
reform political agendas (as in the Planned Parenthood abortion cases)
of imposing their values on someone else's children.
Thus, one should not be optimistic about the consequences of
recasting the model for parents' relationships with their children in a
legalistic "rights" model. In a society facing the most dramatic disinte-
gration of families in recorded human history, it is of little comfort if
parents are encouraged to think about their relationship with their
children in abstract legal terms and concepts that foster separation and
boundaries.69
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN
"The idea of children having rights is, in many ways, a revolution-
ary one."70 This observation is especially true of constitutional rights.
The United States Constitution makes no mention of either parental
rights or children's rights. Indeed, it would have been impossible to
speak of the "constitutional rights" of parents or children (rights which
they could assert against each other in disputes over domestic issues)
prior to the twentieth century.7' A different theory of "rights" pre-
vailed at the time the Constitution was drafted and for more than a cen-
tury thereafter.72 The parent-child relationship was not derived from
the state, was not a property right, and certainly was not perceived in
legalistic terms.
The Founders of our country, however, believed passionately that
certain preconditions were essential for the success of the consti-
68. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2830; Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 492; Danforth, 428 U.S. at 67.
69. For an interesting discussion on how the legal system dissolves "families into
their component parts," see GLENDON, supra note 23, at 121-30.
70. Michael S. Wald, Children's Rights: A Framework for Analysis, 12 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 255, 256 (1979). Children's rights claims raise questions about basic beliefs of
our society because many of the rights being claimed for children could require
substantially altering the role of the state toward parents and children and the role of
parents toward children. Id. at 259.
71. See GLENDON, supra note 23, at 122 (noting that family members did not have
causes of action against one another for much of our history).
72. See, e.g., BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 184-98 (1967); JOHN P. REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION, THE AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS 1-15 (1986). For instance, Montesquieu, the
political writer most frequently cited in America during the Founding Era, emphasized
the distinction between "manners" or "customs" on the one hand and "laws" on the
other, and emphasized that matters of custom and manner were inappropriate subjects for
legal regulation. C.L. DE SECONDAT (BARON DE MONTESQUIEU), THE SPIRIT OF LAWS,
Book XIX, ch. 14 (T. Nugent trans., 1902).
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tutional government. These preconditions included the values and
relations we now refer to as parental rights and children's rights. The
Founders considered Americans' "domestic habits" as necessary
"preconditions" for maintaining the constitutional Republic." These
domestic habits included the traditions of protecting and preparing
children for citizenship, and of parental authority and family
integrity.74 The Founders included these domestic habits among the
cornerstones of liberty, even though they did not consider them
"rights" in the narrow meaning of the word that then prevailed."
Today a broader concept of rights exists, labeling as fundamental
rights principles that were not within the narrow eighteenth century
conception of rights. Because the modern-day concept of rights has
expanded, it surely should encompass those relations, institutions, and
principles (including both children's rights and parents' rights) which
two centuries ago were considered essential to the constitutional
system of liberty.
Recognizing the constitutional rights of children and parents is much
more important today than it was 200 years ago for several reasons.
First, rights have proven particularly valuable to protect the individual
from abuses of the power of the state. The state and its agencies have
become much more powerful, pervasive, and potentially intrusive
today than they were in 1787. Therefore, children's rights and par-
ents' rights must now be recognized in order to protect individual
parents and children from abuses of state powers.76
Second, the concept of rights also marks the minimum essential
protections that all persons owe to each other in our society. Children
are humans, too; they live, breathe, and have their being. If we
exclude any human beings from our system of rights, we violate one
of the fundamental principles on which our constitutional system of
laws, and our very society, is established-the principle of equal
worth under law of all humanity. If rights do not apply to all human-
ity, we all may suffer the stifling consequences.
73. FRANCES GRUND, ARISTOCRACY IN AMERICA 212-13 (1959). See infra note 95 and
accompanying text.
74. GRUND, supra note 73, at 212-13.
75. Consider, for example, the fact that Thomas Jefferson listed only three rights in
his Declaration of Independence: "Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness." THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). The founders believed that the
purpose of government was to secure natural rights like those listed above, while
leaving other concerns to the people. See id.
76. For a chilling description of what life is like when facing a pervasive government
without being protected by a system of individual rights, see generally ALEKSANDR
SOLZHENITSYN, THE GULAG ARCHIPELAGO Vols. 1-11I (Thomas P. Whitney trans., 1973).
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Third, to live as a free and independent human being and citizen,
capable of the pursuit of happiness and of fulfilling the minimal
responsibilities of citizenship, demands much greater rights protection
in 1996 than it did in 1795. As a result, the concept of rights has
expanded. Today, in the age of complex technologies, global market
competition, and an information explosion, people require more to be
self-supporting and to fulfill basic family and civic responsibilities than
200 years ago. Thus, people require more rights protection in order to
secure individualism.
Fourth, in the past 200 years, many of the mediating structures that
used to constitute community and protect the individual have disap-
peared or atrophied. Many writers have noted that there is an inverse
correlation between close relationships and commitments to institutions
of community, on one hand, and legal rights, on the other. As the
former decreases, the latter increases. That is, as relationships of
closeness and insulating institutions of community have waned, the
resort to "rights"-the paradigm that exists for regulating relations
among strangers-has predictably increased.77 For example, in
previous generations, large nuclear families (many siblings), inter-
active extended families, and churches provided substantial support for
many people. Today, those mediating institutions have become much
weaker, fewer, and less able to give support. In the resulting vacuum,
many Americans cut off from these institutions have turned under-
standably to "rights rhetoric" to obtain what such institutions no longer
provide.78
Thus, the question is not whether children have constitutional rights;
they undeniably do. But rights-even constitutional rights-are not a
panacea. The Constitution does not provide the answers to all ques-
tions, not even to all important questions. Rights are the wrong an-
swer to some problems. Government and rights are not the best
solution to all of the problems of society, particularly not for the
problems and needs of children.79 Thus, we must consider what
rights children have and how we can best effectuate those rights with-
out damaging the network of family relationships that are so important
for the healthy growth, nurturing, and development of children.
77. See supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
78. See, e.g., GLENDON, supra note 23, at 3 (considering our focus on "rights" and the
"legalization of our culture" and that such a focus brings as the "cause and consequence"
the deterioration of the pillar institutions of our society).
79. See supra part III.
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V. VIRTUE AND RIGHTS
To answer these questions, we can turn again to the origins of the
Constitution. The Founders of our Constitution had no illusions about
human nature. They believed firmly in the dual nature of humanity-
the capacity for good and for evil. As James Madison noted in the
Federalist Papers: "As there is a degree of depravity in mankind which
requires a certain degree of circumspection and distrust, so there are
other qualities in human nature which justify a certain portion of
esteem and confidence." 80 Alexander Hamilton agreed that society
should "view human nature as it is, without either flattering its virtues
or exaggerating its vices .... ,,8 Many people in the Founding Era
shared this view.82 Recognition of this dual nature created a great
dilemma for the founders of our government. Madison described that
dilemma best:
[W]hat is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on
human nature? If men were angels, no government would be
necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor
internal controls on government would be necessary. In
framing a government which is to be administered by men over
men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the
government to control the governed; and in the next place to
oblige itself to control itself.83
Madison also described the Founders' solution to this conundrum: "A
dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the
government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of aux-
iliary precautions." By "auxiliary precautions" Madison meant the
Constitution, including the structural checks and balances and the sub-
stantive and procedural rights it guaranteed. That would include,
today, children's rights and parents' rights as declared under the law.
But the 'primary' protection was nonlegal-a "dependence on the
people." By that, he meant a dependence on the character of the
people, what political thinkers in that generation called, quaintly,
"virtue." The Founders believed, with Benjamin Franklin, that "only a
virtuous people are capable of freedom. As nations become corrupt
80. THE FEDERALIST No. 55, at 346 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
8 1. THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 458 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
82. See generally Richard Vetterli & Gary Bryner, Public Virtue and the Roots of
American Government, B.Y.U. STUD., Summer 1987, at 29, 29-49 (detailing Founders
views of virtue and its role in the formulation of the constitutional framework).
83. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
84. Id.
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and vicious, they have more need of masters. 85 Madison declared:
"To suppose that any form of government will secure liberty or
happiness without any virtue in the people, is a chimerical idea. 8 6
Samuel Adams believed that "neither the wisest constitution nor the
wisest laws will secure the liberty and happiness of a people whose
manners are universally corrupt. '8 T John Adams acknowledged: "Our
constitution was made only for a moral and religious people. It is
wholly inadequate to the government of any other. 8
Virtue-the "responsibility to one's neighbors and to one's
nation "' 8-was the substructure upon which the superstructure of
constitutional rights and government was built.90 If the foundation
slipped, the government and the liberties it protects would not survive.
Perhaps a contemporary of Alexis de Tocqueville, 9' Francis Joseph
Grund, best described this belief when he commented about American
virtue and American government:
I consider the domestic virtue of the Americans as the principal
source of all their other qualities .... No government could be
established on the same principle as that of the United States
with a different code of morals. The American Constitution is
remarkable for its simplicity; but it can only suffice a people
habitually correct in their actions, and would be utterly
inadequate to the wants of a different nation. Change the
domestic habits of the Americans, their religious devotion, and
their high respect for morality, and it will not be necessary to
change a single letter in the Constitution in order to vary the
85. 9 THE WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 569 (Albert H. Smyth ed., 1970).
86. 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 223 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1904).
87. 1 THE LIFE AND PUBLIC SERVICES OF SAMUEL ADAMS 22-23 (William V. Wells ed.,
1865).
8 8. J. HOWE, THE CHANGING POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JOHN ADAMS 165 (1966).
89. Sunstein, supra note 20, at 742. Sunstein also notes that virtue "is an aspect of
citizenship that is notoriously neglected in public discussion and social practice.
Whether rights are the culprit here may be questioned. But insofar as rights are
understood in purely self-interested terms, it is certainly conceivable that they can crowd
out issues of responsibility." Id. at 743.
90. The Founders considered their enterprise as an experiment testing the proposition
that men are capable of governing themselves sufficiently to have an expansive role in
the government of their nation. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 1, at I (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (proclaiming that America had the task of decid-
ing "whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government
from rehection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend ... on
accident and force").
9 I. French political philosopher and author of Democracy in America, de Tocqueville
came to America in 1831 to study the American regime. Richard D. Heffner, Introduction
to ALEXIS DE TOQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 9 (Richard D. Heffner ed., New
American Library 1956) (1835).
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whole form of their government.92
Thus, the most important right we can give our children is the right
to be taught virtue. If enough children do not acquire that quality-if a
generation arises that lacks a critical mass of citizens who are
genuinely committed to the common good and have the capacity to be
faithful and constant in their commitments (even at the cost of
sacrificing personal desires and self-interest)-our system of self-
government, and with it our liberties, will be lost. For the sake of our
children and ourselves, our rights and our government, the Founders
understood (and we must rediscover) how important it is to protect,
preserve, promote, and encourage those institutions that teach children
virtue, especially marriage and family. No time in the history of the
United States has known a greater need for societal recognition and
inculcation of the importance of marriage and family integrity.
The most important virtue-teaching institution is the family estab-
lished on a lasting marriage. Children learn how to be obedient to the
unenforceable in the stable family home. Children learn how to be
committed beyond self-interest from the lasting marriage of their par-
ents. From the marriage of their parents, children learn why and how
to serve, sacrifice, support, and sustain even when circumstances may
be difficult.
93
Some public policy decisions during the past three decades (both
judicial and legislative) regarding family law have seriously under-
mined the foundation for rights by demoralizing marriage and family
law.94 By convincing ourselves that we could more fully enjoy our
individual rights if we did not bind ourselves to the commitments of
marriage and family, and by making family relations more dispen-
sable, we have chipped away at the substructure of virtue that is the
very foundation of our rights. We have ceased in some instances to
protect and preserve, much less to promote and encourage, those insti-
tutions in which children learn best and most indelibly the lessons of
virtue. The breakdown in support for the family has done more to
deprive children of their rights, including the critical right to be
schooled in the quality of virtue, than anything else that has happened
in our society.95 Nothing is so disastrous to children, and if the
92. Vetterli & Bryner, supra note 82, at 31-32 (emphasis added).
93. For a discussion of the multitude of maladies suffered by children from broken
homes, see generally, Whitehead, supra note 38.
94. See, e.g., Plunkett, supra note 34, at 48 (asserting that the emergence of no-fault
divorce laws, which make divorce too easy to obtain, has effectively abolished
marriage).
95. In addition to teaching virtue, two parent homes better provide for their children.
See Drinan, supra note 7, at 143. "Forty percent of children in America are, what has
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Founders were right, to the future of our constitutional government
and liberties, as the disintegration of the family. This disintegration
has been stimulated by and contributed to the diminution of legal sup-
port for and commitment to strong, stable marriages and families.
VI. OF PLURALISM, PERFECTIONISM, AND PANACEAS
Despite all of the talk about pluralism in recent years, it seems that
the concept has not sunk deeply into our consciousness. Policymakers
tend to search for the perfect policy that will work for all communities,
in all cultures, under all conditions. In fact, many communities and
many subcultures comprise our society. Children in the United States
grow up in a diversity of conditions, cultures, and social circum-
stances. Consequently, one-size-fits-all policies for children's rights
are doomed for failure. This reality mandates flexibility and plural
approaches. We disserve the children of America when we ignore the
reality of diversity, and pretend that there is only one world out there,
when, in fact, there are many worlds. The concept of one policy that
will work successfully in our "homogenous" society is an illusion and
a failure in child welfare policy.
Two hundred fifty years ago, Charles Louis de Secondat, better
known as the Baron de Montesquieu, discovered (or rediscovered) the
best solution to the complexity of pluralism. 96 Considered one of the
founding scholars of sociology and one of the most important political
philosophers in the history of Western civilization, Montesquieu's The
Spirit of the Laws heavily influenced the political writers in America
during the era of the founding of our nation.97 The Founders read,
quoted, debated, analyzed, and largely believed Montesquieu more
than any other secular writer. 9 The title of his most famous work,
The Spirit of the Laws, captures one of Montesquieu's most brilliant
insights. Montesquieu wrote that laws should be framed to reflect the
values-the spirit-of the community.99 Montesquieu recognized that
been described as, 'half-orphans,' meaning they do not have both parents. That,
clearly, is one of the major reasons for child neglect." Id.
96. See DE SECONDAT (BARON DE MONTESQUIEU), supra note 72.
97. For a discussion on Montesquieu's impact on the founders, see DONALD S. LuTZ,
THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONSTrruTIONALISM 139-45 (1988).
98. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison) (characterizing Montesquieu
as the oracle responsible for the separation of powers doctrine employed in the U.S.
Constitution).
99. DE SECONDAT (BARON DE MONTESQUIEU), supra note 72, at Book XIX, ch. 5
(discussing "[h]ow far we should be attentive lest the general Spirit of a Nation be
changed").
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communities would differ.'" ° Thus, he did not advocate a one-size-
fits-all form of government. Although he greatly admired and sup-
ported the republic, he did not believe that a republican form of gov-
ernment was suitable or would be successful to govern all societies.
Instead, he believed that the spirit of the laws should reflect the spirit
of the community. Thus, he stated:
[T]he government most conformable to nature, is that which
best agrees with the humour and disposition of the people in
whose favor it is established .... [Laws] should be adapted in
such a manner to the people for whom they are framed .... 01
As a result, "[i]t is the business of the Legislature to follow the spirit
of the nation ... ."'0 Montesquieu had an obvious influence on the
Founders of the United States Constitution. The system of federalism
which they adopted exhibited a belief in the need for the laws to reflect
the spirit of local (state) communities. 0 3 The dual-sovereignty of the
American government left substantial authority in the states. These
states were closer to the people in their respective communities and
would be able to enact laws that reflected the different character and
spirit of the different state communities."
As applied to the discussion of children's rights, one critical
application of this principle of the spirit of the laws leads to the con-
clusion that we must not expect any single policy will work in all com-
munities. The needs and circumstances, values and aspirations, skills
and understandings, preparation and commitments of individuals and
couples vary within a single state: between white collar and blue collar
communities; between religious and non-religious; between Catholic,
Protestant, and Jewish backgrounds; between rural, inner-city, and
suburban communities; between communities largely composed of
intact families and communities largely composed of single parents;
between never married, divorced, and abandoned families; between
people who were abused as children and people who were spoiled as
children; between people who grew up as only children and people
100. Id. at Book XIX, ch. 7 (noting the differences between the people of ancient
Athens-a democracy-and the people of ancient Sparta).
101. Id. at Book 1, ch. 3.
102. Id. at Book XIX, ch. 5.
103. Thus, while the Founders created a strong central government, the genius of the
system of government they created was federalism-the retention of separate, equal,
independent states with a large measure of residual sovereignty. See, e.g., THE
FEDERALIST No. 32, at 197 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(characterizing federalism as an "equilibrium" between state and federal power).
104. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 200 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) (discussing how the states will have an advantage over the proposed federal
government because the former will be closer to the people).
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who grew up with many siblings; between people who are gregarious
and people who are loners; between people who have mental illness
and people who do not, etc.
Thus, this Essay does not advocate marriage for all individuals and
in all circumstances. Clearly, marriage will not work in some
circumstances and in some subcultures. Some people are not prepared
to implement successfully the principles this Essay espouses.
This Essay advocates marriage as an important mechanism to secure
the "rights" of children. Marriage is a relationship that virtually all
adults have the potential to enjoy and to participate in successfully for
the benefit of children. But not all individuals are prepared for or
committed to marriage, not all couple-combinations create successful
marriages, and in some environments marriage will not flourish.10 5
Judging from caricatures of marriage and irresponsibility portrayed in
the typical television programming and movies, it is apparent that there
are some subcultures in America in which marriage would not be a
successful solution to the needs of children. Thus, this Essay is not
proposing marriage as an all-or-nothing, one-size-fits-all solution to
the problem of children's rights. This Essay is, however, proposing
marriage as a solution that works extremely well in some
communities-so well that it historically was and should be the
aspiration, model, or ideal for the nation at large.'°6
Marriages can be a very successful-apparently the most
successful-system for guaranteeing the rights and welfare for
children.' °7 Does this mean that we should mandate marriage? Should
we compel all persons over thirty years old to get married? Is this
Essay advocating that we abolish divorce even when there has been
105. See, e.g., MURCHISON, supra note 29, at 43-44. As Murchison acknowledges:
Not all marriages are lovingly committed; otherwise, why would there be a 50-
percent divorce rate? Lawfully wedded husbands and wives sometimes beat each
other up, ignore each other's basic needs, or abuse their own children, and
sometimes all three. The point is not that all marriages are good, because
many are awful. The point is that the institution of marriage, based as it is on
exalted promises, is good.
Id. (emphasis added).
106. See, e.g., id., at 50.
Though far from perfect as a social institution . . . the intact family offers
children greater security and better outcomes than its fast-growing
alternatives: single-parent and stepparent families. Not only does the intact
family protect the child from poverty and economic insecurity; it also
provides greater noneconomic investments of parental time, attention, and
emotional support over the entire life course.
Id. (quoting Barbara Whitehead).
107. id.
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infidelity, or repeated or severe physical abuse, or unbearable and con-
tinuing emotional abuse? Should we force parents to remain together
"for the sake of the children?" Should we limit divorce only to couples
who have no minor children? The answer to all of these questions is
obviously and emphatically-No! Marriage cannot be mandated nor
divorce eliminated. Indeed, so long as public policy is to encourage
and support marriage, there must be a safety valve, because there will
be individuals who marry even though they are not prepared for
marriage-because of the social encouragement and social support
available for marriage. Those unprepared individuals and those ill-
paired couples need a safety valve. Thus, this Essay does not advo-
cate mandatory marriage or the abolition of divorce.'
The concept of pluralism also teaches us that there are, and must be,
multiple approaches to protecting the interests of children. Legal rights
constitute a very important element of the total program of securing the
welfare of children in our country; but they are not the only solution or
the only program. Society must provide things designed to help
families flourish, such as prudent public assistance, social service
support agencies, employment considerations (ranging from getting a
job to child care to child birth and adoption leave programs, to flex-
time, etc.), psychological support, medical support, education and the
educational systems, police, religion, other value-supporting mediating
institutions (including Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, service organizations,
etc.), the family (including the nuclear family, the extended family,
and reconstituted families), and alternative or quasi-family relation-
ships (including foster care, informal quasi-parenting arrangements,
etc.). 10 9
108. While divorce should not be abolished, Robert Plunkett makes an interesting
argument in favor of altering the divorce laws so as to make divorce more difficult to
obtain. Contending that no-fault divorce laws in which one person can unilaterally
dissolve a marriage have abolished the crucial element of perpetuality in marriages,
Plunkett insists:
Marriages should be dissolvable only by mutual agreement or on grounds,
such as adultery, desertion, and criminal physical abuse, that clearly involve a
wrong by one party against the other and that by their very nature constitute a
violation of the marriage vows as they are traditionally understood. A husband
or wife who faithfully performs his or her duties in the marriage should have
the absolute right to insist that the marriage remain intact. The addition of
"mutual agreement" to the traditional grounds for divorce eliminates the need
for fraudulent, collusive divorces by preserving the right of couples to end a
marriage in which they both feel trapped.
Plunkett, supra note 34, at 53.
109. See, e.g., BENNEr, OUR CHILDREN, supra note 29, at 65 (asserting that families
need society's support to flourish); see also Lynn D. Wardle, No-Fault Divorce and the
Divorce Conundrum, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 79, 135-37 (concluding that the first
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Another dimension of the concept of plurality and diversity is that
one scheme does not have to work for all communities. American
soci-ety is large enough and the dynamics of its many subcultures are
vital enough that a little leavening will leaven the whole lump. Many
dysfunctional families can benefit from the example of a few very
good, functional families. We need not expect 100% success in mar-
riages or parenting or family stability for our society to continue and
for our system of liberty to survive. Unanimity and perfection are not
required-but a critical mass is. Thus, the question is not how we can
get everyone to be perfect, functional parents, with perfect, stable mar-
riages; rather, the question is what we need to do as a society to gener-
ate and maintain a "critical mass" of stable and successful marriages
and families. "l
Finally, marriage is not a panacea for the needs of children. Not all
individuals are prepared for marriage. Not all combinations of indi-
viduals in marriage will make for successful marriages. Not all mar-
riages will be stable and secure. Not all marriages will last. No mar-
riage will be perfect all of the time. Some marriages will be downright
terrible most of the time. Even when there are stable, secure, loving
marriages, that will not guarantee that the marriage partners will
always be good parents, or that the children will feel loved, valued,
and supported. And not all good parents have perfect children. Even
the best parents in the most secure marriages experience some
difficulties with their children. Thus, marriage is not a panacea. There
is no "magic potion" that will work all of the time with all children and
all adults to guarantee the kind of nurturing, love, and training that we
want all children to have. Perfection is not reality, and we should not
expect perfection of our marriages or our public policies. "' However,
no-fault divorce laws need reforming to address two problems: economic hardship for
divorced mothers and their custodial children and the rate and incidence of divorce).
110. See, e.g., Plunkett, supra note 34, at 54. Commenting on how societal and
legal conditions can deteriorate the bonds of marriage, Plunkett notes:
People earnestly want commitment from their beloved, but it is no longer
possible to have final commitment to or from anybody. You can devote your
life to someone else, but the law and society give you no security against the
other person's leaving and making all your effort pointless. People are
rational; when they know this they will, for their own protection, hold back
on giving love and making sacrifices. Knowing that they can be thrown away
at any time and that divorce has become the rule rather than the exception has
transformed married couples from partners in life's journey into players in a
game of prisoner's dilemma.
Id.
11. See, e.g., MURCHISON, supra note 29, at 44 (asserting that the institution of
marriage is beneficial and good, even though there are individual marriages that are
defective).
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marriage works best to fill the needs and protect the rights of
children." 
2
VII. CONCLUSION
A few years ago, Professor Robert A. Burt wrote: "In my view,
children cannot be adequately or even sensibly protected by giving
them 'rights' that state officials will enforce against parents. Children
can only be protected by giving them parents."' "3 This Essay agrees
with this observation, adding that the best way to "give" children par-
ents is to encourage the marriage of their parents. Parents-a mother
and a father-who are committed to their marriage can best protect
children's rights. To protect children, we need to strengthen and pro-
tect marriage as a social institution. Lawmakers can and should do that
for the sake of our children. That is what we need to secure children's
rights.
112. See, e.g., id. at 50 (quoting Barbara Whitehead) (revealing how having married
parents positively affects nearly every aspect of a child's life).
113. Robert A. Burt, Children as Victims, in CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: CONTEMPORARY
PERSPECTIVES 37, 51 (Patricia Vardin & Ilene Brody eds., 1979).
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